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Abstraction and Authority
Frank H. Easterbrookt
Our Constitution creates a government of laws and not of
men. The distinction is more than slogan. It is embedded in structure. Congress must proceed by law, using intelligible standards
and principles with sufficient breadth to be more than bills of attainder. Rules are proposed, debated, voted on, and published.
Process matters: failure at any step means no law. There are no
common law crimes. Sudden changes in norms may transgress the
Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, or both. Executive
officials must act under standards they can defend in public (and
before courts); judges too must support their decisions by reasons
of general application.
Yet the law teems with devices that defeat uniformity and
predictability. Laws may create plastic standards. They may, for
example, charge an agency to act in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Judges attempt to define "unreasonable"
restraints of trade. Balancing tests blossom in constitutional
law-although lists of factors do not create "tests," for a combination of a lack of weights for the factors and the tension in a'200year stock of precedent enables judges to go any which way. As
society becomes more complex and public actors-Presidents, administrators, legislators, judges-have less time to spend on each
subject, it becomes both tempting and essential (if business is to
be finished at all) to muddle through with standards rather than
rules. Even in theory it is difficult to know when a rule is preferable to a standard;1 in practice neither information nor time permits
a confident choice.2 Language itself is too crude for full specificat Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The
Law School, The University of Chicago. This Article was prepared for The Bill of Rights in
the Welfare State: A Bicentennial Symposium, held at The University of Chicago Law
School on October 25-26, 1991. ©D
1991 by Frank H. Easterbrook. I thank Thomas Collier, G.
Michael Halfenger, Alan J. Meese and Richard A. Posner for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
I Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J Legal Stud 257 (1974). See also Donald Wittman, PriorRegulation versus Post Liability:
The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J Legal Stud 193 (1977).
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U Colo L Rev 773,
778-82 (1990).
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tion even if there were time and data. So the objective of announcing rules in advance, and applying them mechanically to fact, cannot be achieved.
That decision by rule is an objective of law-even a supposition of our constitutional system-cannot be denied. That decision
by rule is a benefit cannot be doubted.3 How far short will we fall?
That depends in part on how general are our norms. Sometimes it
is said that the more abstract the statement, the more discretion in
each case; the more discretion, the less "law" remains in the system. Abstraction (the "reasonable person" approach of tort law)
may liberate courts from rules, license ex post appreciations and
"fair" divisions of the stakes; concrete rules establish incentives ex
ante and restrain discretion later on. Sometimes, however, the
more general norm is the more constraining-and the persons who
seek to boost the level of generality at one time trumpet the virtues of the concrete at others.
How should we choose? Unless there is an answer, we should
abandon hope of government by law. Anyone casting a glance over
the constitutional landscape would encounter many different levels
of abstraction. Judges (not to mention legislatures) read most of
the power-granting provisions, such as the Commerce Clause, quite
broadly. It is difficult to name anything that falls outside legislative power-neither a loaf of bread nor an x-ray.4 Judges read
many of the power-limiting provisions at a lower level of generality. The Contracts Clause, for example, applies not to the institution of contracts but to agreements signed before a law setting up a
new rule.' A legislature thus may regulate contracts as it pleases,
provided it is prepared to wait for those in existence to expire. And
despite the functional equivalence between laws adjusting "rights"
and those altering "remedies," a legislature may suspend or even
extinguish remedies for unkept promises.6 Treating the grants as
broad and the limits as pinpricks has enlarged the power of the
government dramatically; reading the limitations broadly and the
grants narrowly is lexically possible and would have the opposite

' See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175, 117980 (1989) (emphasizing not only certainty for those affected by law and reduction in the role
of the politics of the judge but also the value of rules in helping judges stand against
majoritarian pressure in difficult times).

" Wickard v Filburn,317 US 111 (1942); Summit Health, Ltd. v Pinhas, 111 S Ct 1842
(1991).
0

Ogden v Saunders, 25 US (12 Wheat) 213, 265-68 (1827).
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v Blaisdell, 290 US 398, 429-30, 440-42 (1934).
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effect.7 You need a justification for doing one or the other. This is
a conference about the Bill of Rights, so I pay disproportionate
attention to the amendments to the Constitution but shall not neglect Bruce Ackerman's challenge8 to produce a theory of abstraction adequate to both the power-granting and the power-limiting
clauses.
I.
Consider some examples from recent decisions under the Bill
of Rights.
Michael H. v Gerald D. required the Court to decide whether
the Due Process Clause entitles a father to visit his child over the
protest of the mother and her husband.9 The Justices debated
whether a biological father has a "fundamental right" to visitation,
a question all believed depended in substantial measure on "tradition." Traditions are constructs and may be described in many
ways. Michael H. precipitated one of the few explicit discussions of
the abstraction question. Justice Scalia, for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, contended that the Court should select "the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified."' 1 Finding this
level might be hard, Justice Scalia conceded, but anything else
would be arbitrary. Justice Scalia inquired whether there is a tradition of allowing adulterous fathers to interfere with families and
found none. Justice Brennan, writing for Justices Marshall and
Blackmun as well, rejoined that generality is no more arbitrary
than specificity and proceeded to define the tradition as the right
of biological parents to raise their children, coupled with "freedom
not to conform"''-presumably a fundamental right to commit
adultery. With "freedom not to conform" as a "fundamental
right," the Court holds the whip hand, for all law abridges this

7 See United States v E.C. Knight Co., 156 US 1, 12 (1895) (reading the commerce
power specifically, to mean transportation but not manufacturing); Lochner v New York,
198 US 45 (1905) (treating broadly implicit limits on state power over commerce, so that a
general "liberty of contract" forbids what the Contract Clause itself allows under Ogden).
Richard Epstein is the leading contemporary exponent of the view that the power-granting
clauses should be read narrowly and the power-restraining ones broadly. Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va L Rev 1387 (1987).
8 Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U Chi L Rev 317 (1992).
9 491 US 110 (1989).
10 Id at 127-28 n 6.
" Id at 141 (Brennan dissenting).
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freedom, and a judge may deem insufficient the justification as12
serted by the state for any rule at all.
Cases such as Michael H. show the importance of picking a
level of generality. By choosing narrowly the Court may find no
problem in the law. By choosing broadly the Court may find a
problem with any law it pleases-invoking "tradition" to demonstrate that adultery and other things that society has long deprecated are actually protected by some traditional freedom, that
practices traditionally scorned and punished are no different from
practices traditionally praised, such as providing a home for one's
grandchild."3 By reserving the right to choose a level of generality
to fit the circumstances, as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy did, 4
the Court makes a virtue of "the understandable temptation to
vary the relevant tradition's level of abstraction to make it come
out right.' 5 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy worried that a rule
for selecting a level of generality would change the outcome of
some cases. Exactly so, but it is less than clear why that should be
troubling.
Although Michael H. vividly demonstrates the importance of
the level of abstraction, the. Justices' dispute was driven by the
need to identify a "tradition," which would be used to define a
fundamental right. If you assume that the purpose of that enterprise is to increase the number of protected interests, then "it is
crucial to define the liberty at a high enough level to permit unconventional variants to claim protection."'" If you believe that tradition serves to restrict the powers of judges to pursue their vision of
a good society, then you will choose a lower level of generality. In
either case the selection depends on conclusions about the role of
"tradition" in due process analysis rather than about the function
of abstraction in understanding the Constitution itself.
12 Justice Blackmun took a similar tack dissenting in Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186,

199 (1986), in asserting that the sodomy statute interfered with the "right to be let alone."
As all law interferes with a "right" stated at this level of abstraction, if the "right to be let
alone" is deemed "fundamental" then all law is unconstitutional (at least there is a strong
presumption of unconstitutionality, and only an interest deemed weighty by judges would
suffice to justify the law). Even Professor Tribe finds this unacceptably general. Laurence H.
Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U Chi L
Rev 1057, 1065-67 (1990).
13 Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977).
14 Michael H., 491 US at 132 (O'Connor concurring).
Ir John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory of Judicial Review 61 (Harvard,
1980). See also John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: ConstitutionalTheory and Practice
in a World Where Courts are no Different From Legislatures, 77 Va L Rev 833 (1991).
1" Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 1428 (Harvard, 2d ed 1988).
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Let us pause for clarification. Words such as "general" and
"abstract" are-general. Professor Ackerman and I use them in
different ways. He treats a statement of a right as "more general"
when the upshot is greater protection of the claim of liberty. (Put
to one side that claims of entitlement often conflict, so that it is
not possible to tell which outcome protects rights more fully.) Justice Brennan's view in Michael H. is more general than Justice
Scalia's in this sense. It is more general in a second sense as well:
its statement abstracts away from facts and consequences, not only
applying to more cases (all familial relations) but also depending
less on the specifics of the underlying dispute. I use "abstract" or
"general" in this second sense. The rule "motorists must use reasonable care when driving" is highly general-much more so than
the rule "motorists must obey the speed limit and must drive more
slowly during rain." The more abstract rule may call for detailed
inquiries later (what, after all, is "reasonable care" in the circumstances?) or may not (the rule "do not discriminate on account of a
speaker's viewpoint" eliminates the sort of balancing after the fact
that is common in tort law). Justice Brennan's abstract statement
of familial rights did not eliminate the need to inquire into the
nature and justification of the state's regulation. Sometimes the
point of a highly abstract statement is to set up the occasion for
weighing interests and justifications, sometimes high abstraction
eliminates that possibility. This is a rich source of confusion, but
one I try to minimize.
Harmelin v Michigan17 presents a generality question without
the complication of fundamental rights. The Eighth Amendment
forbids the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. Michigan
prescribes life in prison without possibility of parole for anyone
caught possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine. Do the two conflict? The most specific reading of "cruel and unusual punishments" is that the Eighth Amendment, like similar language in the
Declaration of Rights of 1689 after the Glorious Revolution in England, forbids judges to impose punishments that are not authorized by law."' We could read the language more generally to prevent the legislature from devising cruel or freakish modes of
punishment, such as drawing and quartering or burning at the
stake, neither of which ever got a foothold in the United States.
Still more generally we could understand this language to address
17 111

S Ct 2680 (1991).

18 See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The

Original Meaning, 57 Cal L Rev 839 (1969).
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modes of punishment that, although once common, have become
less so and are also widely viewed as cruel. Then the clause polices
outliers among states, a function it now serves in capital cases. At a
more general level still, the clause is unrelated to either history or
contemporary practice and forbids kinds of punishment (say, fifty
years in prison for a no-funds check) that modern penological theory does not support, even if many states prescribe it. Yet another
boost would forbid any punishment "cruel" by any measure-caseby-case review of proportionality between offense and punishment.
This last approach requires judges to devise and apply their own
theory of criminal sanctions, which may or may not be accepted by
legislatures, the populace, or the academy.
Justice Scalia, writing once again for himself and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, discarded the British practice on the ground that the
lack of common law offenses in the United States meant that the
cruel and unusual punishments clause had to apply to legislatures. 19 He settled on the next-more-general approach, a ban on
cruel modes of punishment unknown in the United States. Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter were uncomfortable with this approach and came to Justice Scalia's result without endorsing his
method. 0 Justice White, carrying with him Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, looked through the other end of the telescope and found a
principle of case-by-case proportionality. To the modern ear "cruel
and unusual" sounds case-specific. Although some historical evidence supports Justice Scalia, Justice White thought that it
"would hardly be strong enough to come close to proving an affirmative decision against the proportionality component."'" Justice
Scalia rejoined:
Surely this is an extraordinary method for determining what
restrictions upon democratic self-government the Constitution
contains. It seems to us that our task is not merely to identify
various meanings that the text "could reasonably" bear, and
then impose the one that from a policy standpoint pleases us
best. Rather, we are to strive as best we can to select from
among the various "reasonable" possibilities the most plausible meaning. We do not bear the burden of "proving an af'9 Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2691. He did not consider the possibility that the Bill of
Rights, including the Eighth Amendment, is the reason why there are no common law
crimes. Accomplishing its task without a struggle does not liberate an amendment for some
other battle. (Justice Scalia also overlooked our one common law crime: contempt of court.)
"0Id at 2702-09 (Kennedy concurring).
2 Id at 2710 (White dissenting).
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firmative decision against the proportionality component,"
ibid.; rather, Justice White bears the burden of proving an affirmative decision in its favor. For if the Constitution does not
affirmatively contain such a restriction, the matter of proportionality is left to state constitutions or to the democratic
process. 2
This passage makes an important point: you can't have a theory of
constitutional interpretation divorced from a theory of judicial review. Section III returns to this subject.
If you conclude from Harmelin that boosting the level of generality is a way to increase the protection of liberties, you are
wrong. Maryland allows children to testify in criminal trials by
closed circuit television. That way the child doesn't need to look
her accused abuser in the eye. Five Justices concluded in Maryland v Craig23 that this satisfied the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment. They asked: "Why do we have confrontation?",
to which they answered, roughly, "so that defendants may receive
fair trials." Having boosted the level of abstraction well beyond
confrontation, the majority asked: "Did this defendant get a fair
trial?", to which it answered "yes." That was that.
Confrontation vanished in the shuffle. Justice Scalia made this
point in dissent, pursuing his regular program of keeping abstraction under control but now with strange bedfellows: Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.24 The real Constitution does not say
"All trials must be fair." It contains a series of rules, which the
drafters anticipated would produce fair trials. Justice Scalia emphasized the rule (confrontation) while the majority emphasized
the hoped-for effects.
Boosting the level of generality-in Craig by emphasizing the
purposes and effects of a rule-can be a method of liberating
judges from rules. Sometimes the practitioners of the method use
it to find "traditions" that would startle students of American society; sometimes they use it to keep the Constitution in tune with
modern tastes. Views can be liberal (as the high-generality approach was in Harmelin) or conservative (as it was in Craig).
Nothing in the method of abstraction prefers one over the other.
To see this consider three cases in which the Court's champion
of specificity showed up on the side of generality. In the first, Em22 Id at 2692 n 6 (emphasis in original). Another footnote 6 (see Michael H. above).
Why do the most important ideas in today's opinions appear in footnotes?
23 110 S Ct 3157 (1990).
2, Id at 3172-73 (Scalia dissenting).
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ployment Division v Smith, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court,
adopting the principle that any rule neutral with respect to religion satisfies the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.2 5
Here is a highly abstract approach: a simple rule covers the whole
field. Smith held that a state may ban the use of peyote, even as a
sacrament-the equivalent of holding that a state may forbid the
use of wine in a Catholic mass.26 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy joined Justice Scalia; Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor all promoted a more
particularistic reading of the text.27 In the second case, City of
Richmond v J.A. 'Croson Co., 28 Justice Scalia concluded that all
racial classifications are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
He treated the Equal Protection Clause as the source of a simple
but exceedingly general rule-government may not use race as a
ground of decision except to undo the effects of an earlier adverse
decision based on the same criterion-although Justice Scalia's
colleagues shied away from or rejected that level of abstraction. In
the third, Justice Scalia joined Justice Brennan in Texas v Johnson, which held unconstitutional a prohibition on flag desecration.29 Justice Brennan stated the scope of the Free Speech Clause
at a high level of generality-the government may not take adverse
action because of the viewpoint of a communication-and thereaf2.5 110
21

S Ct 1595, 1600-02 (1990).
Smith contains a footnote (footnote 5) at least as provocative as the footnotes 6 in

Michael H. and Harmelin. See notes 10 and 22 and accompanying text. The majority trotted out a parade of horribles in which judicial line-drawing concerning accommodation
would displace legitimate democratic choices. When responding to Justice O'Connor's contention, id at 1612-13 (O'Connor concurring), that reasonable judges could avoid these horribles, while a neutrality rule would enforce obnoxious laws, the majority remarked:
[T]he cases we cite have struck "sensible balances" only because they have all applied
the general laws, despite the claims for religious exemption. In any event, Justice
O'Connor mistakes the purpose of our parade: it is not to suggest that courts would
necessarily permit harmful exemptions from these laws (though they might), but to
suggest that courts would constantly be in the business of determining whether the
"severe impact" of various laws on religious practice (to use Justice Blackmun's terminology) or the "constitutiona[l] significan[ce]" of the "burden on the particular plaintiffs" (to use Justice O'Connor's terminology) suffices to permit us to confer an exemption. It is a parade of horribles because it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges
will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of legal
practice.
Id at 1606 n 5. This sounds the theme of note 6 in Harmelin: that there is a link between
generality and the institution of judicial review.
" .Id at 1606-15 (O'Connor concurring in the judgment), 1615-23 (Blackmun
dissenting).
28 488 US 469, 520-25 (1989) (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
2-9 491 US 397 (1989).
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ter had little trouble. Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia, and
30
Kennedy joined his opinion.

In these three cases the high level of abstraction twice leads to
condemnation (Croson and Johnson), and once shelters the state
law (Smith). If we ask instead whether boosting the level of generality protects the champions of civil liberties, the answer is unambiguously "yes" in Johnson, unambiguously "no" in Smith, and
debatable in Croson-for there are civil liberties claims on both
sides of such cases. I have nothing to say about the merits of these
cases (or any others); in each there were respectable arguments for
divergent positions, 3 and in each it was possible to choose a level
of abstraction to achieve almost any desired outcome. Nothing in
the text of the Equal Protection Clause answers the critical question: "Equal with respect to what?"32 One reading of the clause is
that it deals only with the use of law to protect citizens, so that if
the state penalizes the murder of white citizens it must penalize
the murder of black citizens and so protect their lives by deterring
crime. Under this reading, it has nothing to say about racial preferences in doling out public contracts.3 (Substantive entitlements,
on this view, are the province of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.) Increasing levels of abstraction apply the Equal Protection Clause to any use of race that hurts black persons (the "separate but equal" approach) through any use of a poorly justified
classification of any kind, with many stops in between. You can't
get the right level of abstraction from the words, and the justices
have been selective in their use of history.
30 Id at 398. The same majority in United States v Eichman, 110 S Ct 2404 (1990),

rebuffed a renewed legislative effort to prohibit flag-burning.
3, The neutrality position in Smith, for example, derives from the work of Philip B.
Kurland, Religion and the Law (Chicago, 1962), and has at least one adherent on the far left

of the intellectual spectrum. Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court".Kurland Revisited, 1989 S Ct Rev 373. Other careful students of the First Amendment believe that the Free Exercise Clause requires accommodation of some religious practices and on that ground have been critical of Smith. See, for example, Douglas Laycock,
The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S Ct Rev 1; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev 1109 (1990). See also Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103
Harv L Rev 1410, 1420 (1990). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U Chi L Rev 308 (1991), to which Professor McConnell has replied
in Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev 329 (1991).
32 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv L Rev 537 (1982).

3" Although it would have something to say about unequal application of the death
penalty, making McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987), one of the few equal protection
cases in the original sense to reach the Court.
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Justice Scalia, who discoursed on history at length in Harmelin, said nothing about constitutional history in Smith and little in
Croson. Perhaps no history beyond the Civil War was necessary in
Croson, for the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to get states
out of the business of awarding or withholding benefits on the basis of race. Yet four Justices carried a similar principle over to the
federal government in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v FCC,3 4 although
after the Civil War the federal government made extensive use of
race as a basis of benefits (the Freedmen's Bureau was a race-conscious enterprise!), and no Equal Protection Clause applies to the
federal government. For textualists finding any warrant for applying equal protection principles to the national government is a
high, perhaps insuperable, hurdle.3 5 To apply such principles at
their highest level of generality without a textual hook is quite a
feat-one unremarked in Metro Broadcasting.
We have seen all four squares of the matrix: general and specific, rights-protecting and rights-denying. Cases fill each, and all
of the Justices can be found at one time or another in each square.
None chooses consistently. Levels of generality are high sometimes,
low at other times; history that may constrain (or boost) abstraction is sometimes used, sometimes bypassed. I suggest in Section
III that the appearance of inconsistency is misleading; at all events
I do not disparage opening efforts to address a complex subject
that has been overlooked for the bulk of the Court's history. Better
an incomplete discussion than the pretense that there is no
problem.
Movements in the level of constitutional generality may be
used to justify almost any outcome. It is correspondingly important that we have a consistent theory of choice. Perhaps there is
one-one that explains (at least illuminates) the different Justices'
varying approaches, or one that would justify a different line altogether. Section II examines several proposals;3 6 Section III offers
my own perspective.

3-

110 S Ct 2997 (1990). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and

Kennedy would have applied a highly abstract version of the Equal Protection Clause to a
federal program awarding a preference to minority applicants for broadcast licenses. Id at
3028-47.
11 See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law
83-84 (Free Press, 1990).
"e Careful readers will notice that I say nothing about the developing school of legal
pragmatism. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence71-123,
454-69 (Harvard, 1990); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution,72 Minn
L Rev 1331 (1988). My excuse is that with the exception of Frederick Schauer, Playing by
the Rules (Oxford, 1991), the pragmatists do not tackle the abstraction question. Although
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II.
Traditional.Most judges and justices, most of the time, act as
if every text contains its own rule for the level of abstraction. All
you have to do is read. Justice Black was a loud exponent of this
view, but you did not have to be an absolute textualist to find the
approach congenial. Seeing that there is even a question is the
novelty.
Robert Bork has offered one of the best contemporary defenses of the traditional way of solving the generality problem. He
treats the level of generality as part of the meaning of the text. For
most constitutional provisions "the level of generality which is part
of their meaning is readily apparent."3 7 When it is not-when the
rule is stated broadly (for example, "equal protection of the
laws")-"a judge should state the principle at the level of generality that the text and historical evidence warrant. 3' 8 Bork does not
recommend peering inside the minds of the drafters. Their
thoughts are unknowable. Anyway, they left us their words, their
rule of decision, and not their thoughts; only the words passed
through the process of ratification. Thus the question becomes the
level of generality the ratifiers and other sophisticated political actors at the time would have imputed to the text.3 9 We inquire not
what the drafters thought their rule would accomplish (a dead end
version of private meaning we could call "expectationism"), but
what their rule is. Rules may have surprising implications when
applied to novel facts; often the implications of a rule elude its
drafters. Thus Bork is consistent in concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids segregation even though its authors
might have accepted separate-but-equal, and that the First
Amendment curtails libel actions even though defamation actions
were common in 1791.40 Because the meaning of a text lies in its

pragmatists believe that there are "rules" and that decision by rule sometimes is best, they
deny both that rules are essential to the judicial office and that it is possible to locate the
proper level of abstraction. (Schauer, who is more attracted to rules and believes the subject
may be tractable, calls himself a formalist rather than a pragmatist.)
3

Bork, Tempting at 149 (cited in note 35).

38

Id.

" Michael J. Perry spells out the argument more fully than I can do here, giving Bork
the credit that many other liberal scholars deny him by discussing only a caricature of his
argument. See Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of ParticularConceptions of Constitutional Interpretation,77 Va L Rev 669, 675-84 (1991).
40 See Bork, Tempting at 74-84 (cited in note 35); Olman v Evans, 750 F2d 970, 996

(DC Cir 1984) (en banc) (Bork concurring).
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interpretation by an interpretive community, an objective readercentered approach produces an objective level of generality.4 1
You can go a long way with this approach. Many provisions of
the Bill of Rights proclaim their level of generality. The Seventh
Amendment cries out for narrow, historical reading; the Fourth
(with its mention of reasonableness) for more abstraction. But
other amendments resist this approach-and they resist it even if
we look to the meaning the words would have had for the legal
community at the time of drafting.
Take the Eighth Amendment and the problem of Harmelin.
All would be simple if "cruel and unusual punishment" in the
Eighth Amendment means exactly what it means in the Declaration of Rights of 1689. The American interpretive community of
1791 did not hear the words so, however. Members of Congress
talked as if the restriction would apply to legislatures and would
prevent beastly punishments (in one example, the cropping of
ears).42 What makes a punishment beastly? That it is a barbaric
type of punishment, no matter the provocation? That a penalty
that sometimes is all right is wicked as applied to this crime
(twenty lashes for walking your dog without a leash)? Is the benchmark the sensibilities of 1791 or 1971? If these questions had been
put to the interpretive community of 1791, they might have been
answered. But they were not put to it; perhaps they did not occur
to it. So different levels of abstraction may be fully consistent with
the discourse of the drafters; nothing enables us to distinguish.
Bork takes exactly this view of the Equal Protection Clause when
concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racial segregation of schools: the rule has meanings that may differ from the expectations of its authors.
This recognition, too, is a centerpiece of modern philosophy of
language. Even the speaker does not exhaust the meaning of the
expression until possible applications have been exhausted. Someone using the expression "plus" to refer to an operation on numbers may mean addition but could refer instead to the rule: "If
43
both numbers are less than 10,000, add them; otherwise give up.2

"' In this Bork shares much with twentieth-century philosophers of language. See, for
example, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 201-65 (Basil Blackwell,
1953), although for reasons I take up below, see text accompanying notes 48-54, the identification of the interpretive community is a stumbling block.
"' I bypass references to the history, which may be found in Granucci, 57 Cal L Rev 839
(cited in note 18), and the opinions in Harmelin, 111 S Ct 2680.
"3See Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary
Exposition 8-18 (Harvard, 1982).
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An external interpretive community could discover whether the
speaker embraced a rule carrying addition past 10,000 by asking
questions and evaluating the answers. Old texts foil that process.
Because official action by states favoring racial minorities was unheard of in 1871, we do not know (and cannot reconstruct) how the
interpretive community of that era would have understood the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore we cannot tell for a case such
as Croson whether the right level of generality is "no official use of
race" or "no use of race to harm minorities," or some additional
possibility. 44 A problem neither appreciated nor discussed is not
resolved; texts do not settle disputes their authors and their contemporary readers could not imagine.
Worse: the founding generation itself understood that their
texts left many matters open and preferred practice over textual
interpretation as a way of settling them.4 5 James Madison, for example, believed that even in conjunction the Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause did not authorize Congress to
create a national bank. Yet he signed the legislation creating the
second Bank of the United States, remarking that the accommodations of the political branches in the exercise of their powers
pointed more surely to meaning than did his personal view. 46 In
the 46th Federalist Madison defends the allocation of powers as
malleable:
If... the people should in future become more partial to the
federal than to the State governments, the change can only
result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better
administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may
discover it to be most due .. .

Perry, 77 Va L Rev at 677-79 (cited in note 39), makes this point so well that repetition would be otiose.
" See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 Harv L

Rev 885 (1985). Although Powell's assessment is not free from controversy, see Charles A.
Lofgren, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent?, 5 Const Comm 77 (1988), no one

doubts that constitutional debate and practice in the first fifty years gave substantial weight
to the working structure of government and did not rely exclusively on texts or their
interpretation.
46 Contrast his speech on the floor of the House on February 2, 1791 opposing the first
proposal with his decision in 1816 to sign the legislation. See Jefferson Powell, Languages of

Power: A Source Book of Early American ConstitutionalHistory 37-40, 293-95 (Carolina
Academic, 1991).

"' Federalist 46 (Madison) in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed, The Federalist 329, 331
(Belknap, 1961).
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Designed for an unknown future, the Constitution accommodates
change. The power to accommodate implies grave difficulty in using the community of ratifiers to fix a single level of generality.
Modified Traditional. If we cannot consult the interpretive
communities of bygone years, perhaps we can turn to the one with
us today. Ronald Dworkin, Owen Fiss, and Harry Wellington,
among others, propose putting the abstraction question to the contemporary legal community.4 Although the answer may depart
from the one the original community may have given, it has the
virtue of objectivity-of being a consensus answer rather than one
personal to the interpreter, and therefore of conforming to the
ideal of law. The method tracks the recommendations of scholars
such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose hermeneutics stress the ability (indeed, necessity) of texts to adapt as their readership
changes.4 9
Applying methods of literary interpretation to legal texts is,
however, no cure. Styles of literary interpretation exalt creativity,
indeterminacy, novelty.5 0 Readers use texts to enlarge their horizons. Judges, by contrast, use texts to impose obligations-to order
persons to do things, pay money, go to jail. An approach that helps
people broaden their minds does not justify sending them to jail;
that depends on the idea that there are rules. "Let a thousand
flowers bloom" is the right cast of mind for literary interpretation;
attractive ideas will take root and others wither; it would be silly to
have only one "approved" understanding of a poem or novel. Certainty and uniformity are important in law; our theory of legal obligation does not admit the possibility that one text has many
meanings. I have elsewhere thrown cold water on the proposition

4 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 87-90 (Belknap, 1986); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation,34 Stan L Rev 739 (1982); Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication ch 8 (Yale, 1990). Compare
Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U Chi L Rev 835 (1987).
"9 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method xxiv (Crossroad, 2d rev ed 1989). See also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation,90 Colum L Rev 609 (1990)
(recommending a similar approach for statutes), and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation,87 Mich L Rev 20 (1988) (suggesting a "nautical model" of statutory interpretation in which the enacting body charts a course and the current crew changes
that course as necessary).
50 Anyone who doubts this should consult the work of Stanley Fish, whose presence on
the law faculty at Duke has played an important role in introducing lawyers to the hermeneutical methods of the other parts of today's universities. See, for example, Stanley Fish, Is
There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Harvard, 1980);
Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory
in Literary and Legal Studies (Duke, 1989).
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that legal and literary interpretation should
use the same methods,
51
and in this belief have good company.
Let us assume that a legal community is more apt than a literary one to produce answers to hard questions. Why are judges the
proper persons to interrogate the legal community and pronounce
its answers? Judges have tenure in large measure to insulate them
from swings of contemporary opinion, the better to make them
faithful to decisions taken in the past. If these decisions are to be
updated, better to have the revision performed by those who are
sensitive to the contemporary will-administrative officials, Congress, the President. Although judges are more apt to be dispassionate than are political officials, their dispassion need not lead
them to be more faithful to the median view of the contemporary
legal culture; it may lead them to be more faithful to their own
views. This is the dark side of tenure.5 2 To the extent it influences
judges, achieving objectivity is impossible.
If the living legal community is indeed the right benchmark, it
is tempting to ask: why a constitution? A written constitution-the instrument that separates us from the United Kingdom,
where living majorities mold traditions and thus governmental institutions to suit tastes-is designed to be an anchor in the past. It
creates rules that bind until a supermajority of the living changes
them. You can imagine change by the living in ways other than
those described; after all, our Constitution was ratified without the
unanimity required by the Articles of Confederation.5 3 That constitutional change requires a supermajority sustained over an extended period cannot be doubted, however-for to doubt it is to
doubt the ability of the past ever to constrain the present, and
thereby to destroy the source of the judges' claim to countermand
the will of contemporary majorities. Yet putting questions about
the level of abstraction to today's legal community dispenses with
both the supermajority requirement and the need for some stability in that opinion (which must endure long enough to obtain a
S, Frank H. Easterbrook, Approaches to Judicial Review, in Jack David and Robert

McKay, eds, The Blessings of Liberty: An Enduring Constitution for a Changing World
147, 148-50 (Random House, 1989). See also Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A
MisunderstoodRelation ch 5 (Harvard, 1988); Paul Brest, Interpretationand Interest, 34
Stan L Rev 765, 769-73 (1982); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan L
Rev 1, 2-3 (1984); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw U L Rev 226, 238-40 (1988).
6, See generally Easterbrook, 61 U Colo L Rev 773 (cited in note 2).
"
See Akhil Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U Chi L Rev 1043, 1047 (1988).
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two-thirds vote in both chambers of Congress and a majority in
three-fourths of the states' legislatures, a process that takes considerable time).
At all events, if we are to query the living legal community,
which one? You get very different answers to the cases presented
in Section I from scholars, practitioners, and judges. In the United
States judges are selected from such divergent parts of the profession that it is a mistake to speak even of a judicial interpretive
community. A judge devoted to selecting a modern interpretive
community external to his own preferences may play the field.
Who receives the (hypothetical) question about the right level of
generality in Harmelin, Croson, or Johnson? Choosing a hypothetical interlocutor determines the answer. 4 Add to this the fact that
the judge not only chooses the recipient of the question but also
supplies the answer (it is a hypothetical community and hypothetical question, after all!) and you have no useful guidance.
I do not mean. by this that you never get'useful answers; many
questions in law have determinate answers (or a substantial range
of determinacy). Rather, the point is that we deem a constitutional
question interesting and difficult when our hypothetical community gives different answers. The process therefore does not usefully constrain interpretation and cannot repair the difficulties
with the traditional view, which looks to the interpretive community at the time of enactment.
Consistency. One variant of modified traditionalism deserves
special attention. Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf, in the most
ambitious analysis of the abstraction problem to appear in the legal literature, contend that the court should treat the Bill of
Rights as a coherent whole and generalize to examples that were
not contemplated at the time. 5 A statement fails when the Court
must ignore the rationales of other amendments or cases describing particular instances. Thus a "right to be let alone" is too general, because it makes earlier cases sustaining particular laws inexplicable. But a "tradition of protecting the marital unit against
claims of adulterous natural fathers" is too specific, because it cannot rationalize earlier cases acknowledging, say, a right to contraception by unmarried couples.

"' A point I make with respect to statutes in Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Interpretation,11 Harv J L & Pub Pol 59, 62-65 (1988).
"5Tribe and Dorf, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1059-64 (cited in note 12). See also Laurence H.
Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 73-80 (Harvard, 1991).
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This is a variant rather than an independent proposal because
it expressly depends on the propriety of using methods of literary
interpretation 5 6 and attempts to construct a contemporary interpretive community-the one reflected in recent decisions of the
Supreme Court. I find much to admire in this attempt to make the
point of reference more specific (and more accessible), thereby cutting down on judges' ability to influence outcomes by going community-shopping. Any step in the direction of objectivity is
welcome.
As a variant, however, the Tribe-Dorf proposal suffers from
most of the difficulties of its lineage. Their efforts to repair the
defects of this category of methods creates new problems, The authors patch over some difficulties by assuming that "the issues of
interpretation that arise in construing the words of the Bill of
Rights are identical to those that arise in the fundamental rights
context,657 although most members of today's interpretive community (including those who sit on the Court) believe that there is a
substantial difference between legal claims based on constitutional
text and those that are not. Tribe and Dorf patch over other difficulties by assuming consistency and calling for a combination of
interpolation and extrapolation. Yet you can demand consistency
in the treatment of new cases only if the existing stock of rules
(and precedents) is consistent. You cannot take out more consistency than you put in. Given two inconsistent propositions (in the
text or the cases), you can show or refute any proposition at all.
Tribe and Dorf assume but do not demonstrate that the stock
of reference points is consistent. Why should we expect it to be
consistent? The Third, Fourth, and Seventh Amendments operate
on dramatically different planes of generality. Interpolating to the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth does not yield one of these rather
than another. If Justice Scalia prefers the historical approach of
the Seventh Amendment, while Justice Brennan uses the reasonableness standard of the Fourth for a benchmark, is either one
"wrong?" Maybe so, if precedent marks a clear choice and speaks
as our interpretive community. Yet where is the choice? You cannot get five pages into the Tribe-Dorf article without encountering
a glaring inconsistency: the difference between constitutional protection of abortion in Roe v Wade"8 and the failure in Bowers v

Id at 1072-77.
Id at 1061 (emphasis added).
58 410 US 113 (1973).
'6

17
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Hardwick 9 to include sodomy within the same class. These are irreconcilable decisions-Tribe and Dorf think so, I think so,6 0 the
Justices themselves think so. At least seven of the Justices who
voted in Bowers would have treated the abortion and sodomy
questions identically: Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, by protecting both; Justices Burger, White, and Rehnquist (perhaps Justice O'Connor too), by protecting neither. Only
Justice Powell saw a difference-adhering to Roe while joining the
majority in Bowers-and he is reputed to have changed his mind
about Bowers after he left the Court.
The contrast between abortion and sodomy illustrates a problem in making decisions by majority vote, as the Court does (and
as the Constitutional Convention, Congress, and the ratifying state
bodies do). Even if every member of a body behaves consistently
the collectivity will generate inconsistent results.6 1 How pervasive
the inconsistency may be is a subject of legitimate debate; 2 that
we are doomed to have some is beyond all debate. Inconsistency
embedded in the stock of precedents-one that now fills more than
500 volumes-disables proposals to extrapolate consistently from
these opinions. The Constitution is a series of compromises, starting with the Great Compromise between the large and small states
(equal suffrage in the Senate) that made political union possible,
and the three-fifths compromise over questions of representation.
Prudence rather than unifying principle shaped the initial document and all of its amendments.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Tribe and Dorf embrace
one of the principal implications of their view: strict path dependence, in which the meaning of the Constitution varies with the
order in which cases reach the Court. Suppose Bowers had been
decided in 1973 and the abortion question had come up for its initial decision in 1986.63 Then consistent application of the prece-

478 US 186 (1986).
0 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association, 10 Harv J L

& Pub Pol 91, 92-93 (1987).
01 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 59-60 (John Wiley, 1951).
For applications to courts see Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv
L Rev 802, 813-32 (1982); Lewis A. Kornhauser and Laurence G. Sager, Unpacking the
Court, 96 Yale L J 82, 109-10 n 37 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 Iowa L Rev 949 (1990).
02 Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A CriticalIntroduction ch 2 (Chicago, 1991), provides a careful assessment of the state of the literature.
63 An unlikely supposition, as only the outcome of Roe made Bowers a case worth litigating. Still, it is a thought experiment worth pursuing, as no one wants a form of constitutional adjudication in which judges always must increase their degree of "creativity" and
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dents implies the absence of any fundamental right of intimate association. The abortion case would be simple after the sodomy
case: if the Constitution does not protect sexual activities that
have few effects on unconsenting parties, it does not protect decisions that affect the welfare of other family members and the potential child. Would Tribe and Dorf conclude that their method
compelled the Court to decide against abortion in 1986 if it had
decided against sodomy in 1973? Not at all; they would not (and
need not) because there are contrary strands in the contraception
cases. Neither result of the abortion case could be reached by simple extrapolation.
And so it is with the other subjects. You cannot get to Harmelin (or its opposite), to Croson, or to most of the other cases discussed in Section I by assuming that the interpretive community is
the body of recent precedents. Texas v Johnson comes closest to
being a "determined" outcome, although four justices did not agree
and managed to cite a goodly number of recent cases that make
the abstract principle "there shall be no viewpoint discrimination"
(the one to which the majority adhered in Johnson) look like an
overstatement of the body of precedent. "No viewpoint discrimination" is a good principle on many grounds and one I find congenial,64 but it cannot be produced by simple interpolation of
precedent.
Adding a dollop of the Ninth Amendment to the stew of precedent, as Tribe and Dorf propose, does no better at producing
consistency. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." This tells us that
there are rights not spelled out; John Hart Ely is right to say that
an originalist must take this text seriously even if it is uncomfortably vague. 5 Still, rights "retained" implies an historical inquiry,
just as the Seventh Amendment (the "right of trial by jury shall be

depart still farther from the text-an approach that would be compelled if every case built
on the last one and urged "a little more" departure, followed by extrapolation. We must
therefore imagine a sequence in which the first case simply asks the Court to confirm the
conventional wisdom (in 1973 and before, that sodomy is not a fundamental right) and the
second case seeks a departure (in this example, the arrival of the abortion question for the
first time in 1986).
" See American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 327-28 (7th Cir 1985), aff'd
without opinion, 475 US 1001 (1986).
6 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 34-41 (cited in note 15). See also Randy E. Barnett,

ed, The Rights Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment (George Mason, 1989).
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preserved") has precipitated historical inquiry. 6 There is no right
level of generality at which to read history-we are back to
Harmelin-and no reason to suppose that historical investigation
would produce clues that could promote consistent adjudication.
Countervailing Rights. Bruce Ackerman asks us to abandon
this pursuit and take up a different subject. He seeks consistent
treatment of the level of generality of the power-granting clauses
and the power-denying clauses. The New Deal settled the question
for the power-granting clauses. Once the Commerce Clause is
takei to authorize Congress to control whatever has an indirect
effect on commerce, the national government may do almost anything a majority in Congress thinks proper. Unless the power-constraining clauses (except the Contracts and Takings Clauses!) also
expand, the original balance is undone, and perhaps the people will
be undone. How ironic if the judges who, like me, are most skeptical of governmental power should accept the power-expanding half
of this equation, reject the power-limiting half, and end up as
statists.
The force driving this argument is the belief that Something
Big happened in 1933-53: an unwritten amendment to the Constitution incorporating the New Deal and authorizing a great enlargement of federal power.6 7 I confess to doubting the equivalence of
written and unwritten amendments to the Constitution. Perhaps
this marks me as a throwback. So be it. Shouldn't good interpreters of this document strive to exemplify the eighteenth-century
mind? (Well, maybe the nineteenth-century mind; let us not forget
1871.) Too, I wonder why the discarding of the written provisions
of the Constitution in favor of unwritten amendments implies anything about judicial power. If the document no longer binds us in
some respects, why does it govern in others? Political systems can
survive without textual anchors in centuries past-most of the liberal democracies do so quite nicely. If we have cast aside the limited power-granting clauses and the explicit limits in the Contracts
and Takings Clauses, it does not follow that judges should make
extravagant claims in the name of still other clauses.

66

See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555, 579-80 n 15 (1980) (Burger)

(invoking the Ninth Amendment as collateral support for the proposition that the press's
traditional access to criminal trials is constitutionally protected even though the right to a
"speedy and public trial" identified in the Sixth Amendment belongs exclusively to the
accused).
67 See Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap, 1991).
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Ackerman seeks to attract me to his enterprise by placing one
of my judicial heroes in the vault of his pantheon. He treats the
second Justice Jackson as the model interpreter of the New Deal
Constitution.6 8 But which Robert Jackson should we emulate: the
generalizer of the flag salute cases and the Japanese removal
cases, 6 9 or the anti-generalizer of Terminiello and the steel seizure
cases? 70 I think Jackson one of the nation's greatest Justices, not
only because of his eloquence and his support for the liberties established in the text of the Bill of Rights, but also because he
doubted the omniscience of judges and the warrant for expansive
claims of judicial power. Jackson was an enforcer, not a creator, of
rights, and Ackerman would cast him in a*different role.
Even Ackerman's strong appeal to our common denominator
does not lead me to embrace his approach to abstraction. For I do
not locate the advance of federal power in the New Deal. It oc7 1 more than
curred in McCulloch v Maryland,
a century earlier,
when the Court invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause to hold
that Congress could establish a national bank. Everything after
that was a matter of details. Important details to be sure, as majorities occasionally could loose a bolt of lightning at a law or three.72
But these were temporary setbacks, notches in an upward-sloping
graph. 73 Dramatic boosts to national power came from the railroads, telegraphs, and other instruments that knitted the nation
together (the optimal size of government grows as transportation
and communication become cheaper) and two real constitutional
amendments that made the federal government the locus of control: the Sixteenth, creating the personal income tax, and the Seventeenth, ending state legislatures' selection of senators. It is not
proper for courts to rein in the effects of changing economic conditions or express amendments augmenting hational power.
Most contemporary debates about abstraction do not concern
federal power. They have to do with state power. And the states
"8Ackerman, 59 U Chi L Rev at 334-38 (cited in note 8).
1, West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943); Korematsu
v United States, 323 US 214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson dissenting).
" Terminiello v Chicago, 337 US 1, 13-37 (1949) (Jackson dissenting); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson concurring).
71 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
72 Even in the heyday of Lochnerian substantive due process and the nadir of the commerce power, most laws by state and federal governments were favorably received in the
Supreme Court. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second
Century, 1888-1986 47-50 (Chicago, 1990).
73 E.C. Knight, 156 US 1, for example, was effectively undone by Swift & Co. v United
States, 196 US 375 (1905), before a decade was out.
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did not receive their powers from the Constitution. They owe their
powers to the consent and acquiescence of their own people. State
power decreased during the New Deal-not only because of the
augmentation of national power, but also because the steady decline in the costs of transportation and communication made states
less important. Two hundred years ago states could impose taxes
or regulate commerce with few obstacles. Now the people and firms
will respond to state and local regulation by taking their business
(or themselves) elsewhere.
As insularity fell, so did inroads on civil liberties. In 1787
seven states had established churches; all were dis-established long
before the Supreme Court applied the First Amendment to the
states in 1940.74 The Court's role in civil liberties (with the exception of its holdings about race relations) has been that of a follower, not a leader. It extirpates in the name of the Constitution
practices that have already disappeared or dwindled among the
states. It obliterates outliers.75
The slow but steady erosion in the powers of the states should
lead Ackerman to recommend that the Court decrease the level of
generality and do less to interfere with state actions. Federalism
was an important part of the original design, which would suffer at
Ackerman's hands. He proposes to use the decrease in state power
attributable to a changing economy as the fulcrum of a still further
decrease at the hands of the judiciary. Yet it should be significant
for him that most of the ways in which states affect personal liberties (for example, impose life sentences for crime, punish flagburning, limit fathers' access to their biological children, use race
as a ground of decision, regulate sexual activity) are unrelated to
the issues of the New Deal. States did not acquire their power to
put people in jail from the Franklin Roosevelt Administration.
These are old issues, prudential and moral disputes present at the
foundation. Ackerman does not persuade me that the level of abstraction appropriate to the problems in Harmelin, Michael H.,
Croson, Jackson, and Craig should be different in 1891 and 1991.
Smith is a better case for Ackerman; Oregon denied Smith unemployment compensation after his discharge for smoking peyote.
7
Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 303 (1940) (applies the Free Exercise Clause to
the states); Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15 (1947) (applies the Establishment
Clause to the states).
" See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago, 1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies,79 Cal L Rev
751, 765-69 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, Bills of Rights and Regression to the Mean
(forthcoming 1992).
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Unemployment compensation is an invention of the welfare state,
and local programs are so underwritten by the Treasury that they
are effectively federal. Yet in Smith the Court took Ackerman's
advice and used a high level of abstraction-much to his dismay, I
should think.
Is It All Incoherent? My survey of the terrain of approaches
did not produce a reliable way to select a plane of generality on
which to locate a constitutional rule. Perhaps there is no way at all
to do this. Dean Brest, for example, believes that the abstraction
problem defeats all efforts to construct a system of adjudication by
neutral principles. 76 As Brest put it, the quest for "objectivity in
legal interpretation [is] on a par with the fantasy of a single, objective reading of Hamlet or of Balinese culture. ' 77 Many other
thoughtful persons have come to the same conclusion.
Brest's claim is overstated if he means that it is impossible to
select the level of generality for any rule on a principled basis.
Hamlet and Balinese culture are substantially more complex than
most legal rules, and simplicity promotes understanding-even if
imperfect.78 If we really can't settle on the right level of generality,
we will have a difficult time explaining why people must pay the
piper for failing to anticipate the judges' disposition. Brest's claim
is unanswerable, however, if limited to the category of cases the
legal culture deems "hard" at a particular time. They are hard precisely because the kit of legal tools cannot produce agreement
among those competent in their use. There is no way out of this
conclusion. The question is: what do we make of it?
III.
Multiple legitimate levels of abstraction imply multiple legitimate meanings of the text. The problems that concern us today
were not settled in the past and encoded in authoritative rules;
they must be settled by the living.
Who among the living? Anyone reading a law review "knows"
that this means judges. The author starts with the assumption that

7' Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof
Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 Yale L J 1063, 1084-85, 1091-92 (1981).
71 Brest, 34 Stan L Rev at 771 (cited in note 51).

"8See Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L Rev 1 (1990); Kay,
82 Nw U L Rev at 248-50, 273-84 (cited in note 51). See also Margaret Jane Radin and
Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U Pa L
Rev 1019, 1046-54 (1991) (defending, albeit tepidly, the proposition that there can be understandable rules).
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the judge will decide-that was settled by Marbury v Madison79 in
1803-and then displays a range of meanings that could be imputed to the text, imploring judges to select the best one. Judicial
opinions often have the same flavor. Judges' right to the final say
having been established long ago, the plasticity of old texts becomes a platform for an enlargement of discretion.
When interpreting the Constitution it is tempting to see how
far old texts can be pressed-for any limitations, any at all, create
at least some possibility of horrible deeds slipping into the cracks.
A sophisticated lawyer worried about abuses starts with the text
and identifies its purposes and consequences. Next comes a move
to a level of abstraction selected so that the rule governs whatever
may threaten these interests to any degree. That move eliminates
loopholes, but at the expense of making the rule so universal that
it occupies the field of governmental action. Then the judge announces that "reasonable" limitations on the interests so identified
will be respected, and no others. What is "reasonable," except
what is wise? Interests conflict and overlap, so that to choose generality in a way that focuses attention on interests is to give judges
an essentially political role.8 0
If indeed the Constitution deputizes judges to settle all hard
legal issues, then inability to settle on a level of abstraction greatly
but properly enlarges the judicial role in governance. If it does not,
then the sequence should be reversed. Instead of assuming power
and then searching for a level of abstraction, the court should
search for that degree of generality capable of justifying a judicial
role. Unless it is possible to find an answer that adequately differentiates judicial from political action, the judge should allow political and private actors to proceed on their way-that is, the judge
should honor the structural features of the Constitution allocating
powers to states and to political actors who have followed the approved forms such as bicameral approval.
Judges, more than other political actors, must answer the
question why anyone should obey. The President has the Army,
Congress the purse. Judges have reason. They could assemble political coalitions for protection; the Supreme Court has a formida-

11

5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

80 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 Yale L

J 943, 984-95 (1987); Miller v Civil City of South Bend, 904 F2d 1081, 1129-30 (7th Cir
1990) (en banc) (Easterbrook dissenting), rev'd as Barnes v Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S Ct
2456 (1991); American Jewish Congress v City of Chicago, 827 F2d 120, 137-40 (7th Cir
1987) (Easterbrook dissenting).
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ble constituency (including the press, which relies on the Court to
protect speech and repays the debt by rallying to the Court's defense). But other political actors can appeal to the same constituencies, which will not lift a finger to defend judges who march to
their own drummer. Judges must persuade other political actors,
and the public at large, that courts produce net benefits; only that
demonstration makes it sensible for others to obey judicial decisions as a rule, enforcing even edicts that a political majority believes unsound. The rule of law attracts formidable support only so
long as people believe that there is a rule of law and not a rule by
judges. The need to persuade society to obey sets bounds on judicial creativity; it is most unlikely that obedience will long be forthcoming to an institution that appears to be subcommittee chairmen wearing robes.
Whether or not obedience endures, there remains the question
of justification. Public power in the United States depends on law.
Everyone exercising the power of the state needs a legal justification, not just a moral or prudential one-the cop making an arrest,
the bureaucrat denying an application for welfare benefits or collecting a tax, the commissioner dissolving a merger, the cabinet
secretary reducing the number of landing slots at an airport, everyone. When rules cannot limit the exercise of authority, we define
justification as process (for example, approval by both houses of
Congress and the signature of the President). You can describe a
society where public acceptance of official demands is a complete
justification for those demands. In nations without constitutions
(the United Kingdom, for example), tradition and authority merge.
Our republic was founded on contractarian premises, however, and
no one holding power here asserts that public acquiescence is
sufficient.
Everyone needs a justification. "Everyone" includes judges.
Especially judges, who insist that other public officials scrupulously observe the limits on their own power even when prudence
might justify additional powers.8 1 Especially judges, who alone
have tenure of office, something justified if at all by the tendency
of tenure to make them more faithful to decisions taken in the past
at the expense of convenience today. Especially judges, whose
charge is the maintenance of the rules of the game and the faithful
implementation of decisions taken under its rules. As judges (and
scholars) demand that political officials justify their acts with more

" See,

for example, INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983); Youngstown, 343 US 579.
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than a claim of prudence, so judges must supply no lesser justification for their own acts.
How did it come to be that judges have any role in reviewing
decisions taken by other branches? That power is not conferred
expressly in the Constitution. It was inferred from the constitutional structure. And the way in which it was
inferred informs our
82
understanding of the abstraction problem.
The major premise of Marbury v Madison is that the Constitution is law-the supreme law, binding on all organs of government, and sufficiently clear to be enforceable as law. Chief Justice
Marshall gives the ex post facto clause as an example and asks rhetorically whether in case of clear conflict one applies the retrospective criminal law. Another premise is that the Constitution includes a hierarchy-that it is supreme over statutes and treaties.
Finally, Marshall argues that every public official owes a duty, by
virtue of his oath if not the written nature of the document, to
follow the supreme law in the event of conflict. Written instruments are meant to have bite; and our Constitution not only is
written but also establishes a system of limited government. If
there are limits then there are boundaries to be patrolled. 3 Otherwise our government is not limited after all.
Problems lurk in this explanation. It begs the critical question:
why must political actors pay more attention to the judges' views
than the judges pay to the legislature's? Chief Justice Marshall's
implicit answer is that the constitutional hierarchy binds all
branches, that to demonstrate the argument for the meaning of the
Constitution is to produce acquiescence. Congress and the President must follow the Court because the same syllogism that drives
the Court's action drives everyone else's. That is, there are understandable rules. They were laid down in the past and govern us
still. To have identified the rule is to have identified the reason
why all must obey. The Supreme Court's decision about the content of the rules prevails because of the definition of a rule, given
to all alike.
Judicial review under Marbury is a search for rules."4 If the
age or generality of the text frustrates the statement of a rule, then
82 See Easterbrook, Approaches to JudicialReview (cited in note 51).
83

Id at 178-80. See Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution

ch 4 (Yale, 1990), explaining the difference between this justification of judicial review and
the more limited approach some state courts had taken.
84 See Stephen L. Carter, ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A
PreliminaryDefense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 Yale L J 821 (1985); Stephen L. Carter,
Constitutional Improprieties:Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Gov-
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it also defeats the claim of judicial power. If the living must indeed
chart their own course, then the question is political, outside the
domain of judicial review. You cannot have a view that denies the
power of the past to rule today's affairs yet asserts that Article III
still binds. Judicial review depends on the belief that decisions
taken long ago are authoritative. The judges' duty is "to declare all
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void." 85
This assumes that the document has a "manifest tenor." The writers and ratifiers thought it did. We broke from England by having
rules-and therefore enforcement-instead of having only practices and consensus that are always in political evolution, and
therefore not enforceable by judges.
Marbury teases judicial review from structure rather than language. It therefore necessarily admits the possibility of other inferential, structural claims-a possibility that quickly developed in
the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine of McCulloch. Structural arguments can enlarge review further. Perhaps judicial review
flows from the terror of the alternative: chaos. So it seemed to
Holmes, who opined that the Republic would dissolve if the federal
courts did not have the power to declare state laws unconstitutional.86 So it seemed to Learned Hand, whose argument goes:
[I]t was probable, if indeed it was not certain, that without
some arbiter whose decision was final the whole system would
have collapsed . . . . The courts were undoubtedly the best
'Department' in which to vest such a power, since by the independence of their tenure they were least likely to be influenced by diverting pressure. It was not a lawless act to import
into the Constitution such a grant of power."7
Such a line
acknowledged:

of

argument

has

a

corollary,

which

Hand

[I]t was absolutely essential to confine the power to the need
that evoked it: that is, it was and always has been necessary to
distinguish between the frontiers of another 'Department's'
authority and the propriety of its choices within those fron-

eminent, 57 U Chi L Rev 357, 364-76 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil,
57 U Cin L Rev 849 (1989).
88 Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Wright, ed, The Federalist 489, 491 (cited in note 47).
88 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 295-96 (Peter Smith, 1952).
87 Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1958 29
(Harvard, 1962).
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tiers. The doctrine presupposed that it was possible to make
such a distinction, though at times it is difficult to do so.88
One thing this version of the claim for judicial power cannot
do is justify novelties. Will the Republic fall apart if some states
use capital punishment and others do not? If some states permit
sodomy and others prohibit the practice? The argument from
chaos cannot establish that diversity of practice about debatable
moral questions is baleful. Quite the contrary. Many visions of utopia entail great diversity of moral views and the power of people to
choose their polity. Our particular governmental structure recognizes the value of different solutions (in different cities and states)
to debatable questions. This is not so that states may "experiment," which implies that we will converge on a single answer to
every problem. It is, rather, because people differ in tastes and
moral views, both of which evolve. Divergent practices and the
power to choose (or move) are important elements of liberty.
The need to produce a theory of meaning that is also adequate
to justify the judicial role constrains the level of abstraction. It implies a search for a common denominator, in which judges enforce,
against the contrary views of other governmental actors, only the
portion of the text or rule sufficiently complete and general to
count as law. 9 Several of the cases in Section I yield quickly to
this approach. Michael H. involved an extra-textual claim, and it
was correspondingly hard to locate any legal principle requiring
every state and local government to adopt the same rule. This implies a low level of abstraction, for a highly general approach along
Justice Brennan's lines dispenses altogether with the need to justify judicial power and dispense by assumption with the possibility
,of different legitimate answers. Johnson and Craig are the flip
side: here there are strong textual claims to be honored. Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Johnson invoked a legal norm; the
dissenters sought to particularize the subject in order to evade it.
Just the opposite happened in Craig,where the majority increased
the level of abstraction in order to evade a strictly legal claim: that
whatever could be said about the accuracy of the verdict, it had
been reached without confrontation. The majority in Craig, as it
seems to me, sought to improve on rather than enforce the Sixth
Amendment. Harmelin also is straightforward. To observe, as the

88 Id at 29-30 (emphasis added). See also id at 66-77.
89 See Bork, Tempting at 166-67 (cited in note 35); Easterbrook, Approaches to Judi-

cial Review at 161 (cited in note 51); Kay, 82 Nw U L Rev at 248-50 (cited in note 51).
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dissenters did in support of a general proportionality rule, that
neither text nor history proves an argument against such a rule is
to invert the theory of review, doing nothing at all to support a
judicial role. It may be that a rule limited to barbaric modes of
punishment will have limited contemporary effect, but it is not
possible to make greater demands in the name of law.
Cases such as Smith are tougher. Neutrality between religion
and secular affairs is at once a highly general rule and one that
minimizes the judicial role. It is easy to see why a majority found it
attractive. Yet free "exercise" implies more than free "belief'":
Michael McConnell makes a strong case that the drafters and ratifiers used this word to signify accommodation of religious practice.90 Boosting the level of abstraction to achieve a neutrality rule
produces the most modest claims of judicial power-maybe too
modest, just as Craig denied judicial authority through this device.
In Croson and Metro Broadcasting, greater abstraction (e.g.,
"make no use of race") reduces judicial discretion but increases
judicial power relative to the other branches. It is the claim of judicial power that must be justified; although a reduction in judicial
discretion is desirable, we do not get there unless the scope of authority has first been established. Again the level of generality may
be excessive in relation to either textual or historical support.9 '
You will notice that I have omitted two lines of argument that
appear over and over. One is that to settle on any approach to
selecting the level of abstraction is to allow some hideous outcomes-capital punishment for the common cold and like abominations. Rules have borders; if there are borders people may take
advantage; thus there should be no bright lines. The other sally is
that settling on any one approach makes a fossil of the Constitution. As the world is changing, it would be regrettable to have governmental institutions strangled by a skeletal hand from the past.
Arguments of both flavors are common. Both are inconsistent
with the premise of Marbury. They assert that the Constitution is
not law-indeed, shouldn't be law. Maybe so, but what then is the
justification of judicial power? Why is updating to be done by persons who cannot be removed from office and have been insulated
from contemporary society? Having knocked out our legal system's
premier justification, the proponents of these arguments need to
90

McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1488-90 (cited in note 31).

91 1 repeat the caveat from Section I. Determining the right answer in hard cases such

as Smith and Metro Broadcasting would require a substantive investigation-one of the
kind Professor McConnell has conducted and I have not.
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provide a substitute and typically do not. It is hard to find judges
willing to say in public that Marbury is wrong and that they have a
different justification of the judicial role.
As soon as you distinguish judicial from political power, you
have a short and satisfactory answer to the problem of the dead
hand. As the drafting of the Constitution becomes remote judicial
power is harder to justify (because it is harder to point to rules of
law), but the ability of the political branches of the government to
keep in touch with the times increases. All judges can, do is intervene to negate a political choice. When they decline to do this, the
ability of political society to keep up with the times is unimpeded.
Congress gained plenary legislative powers not only from popular
will (recall Madison's argument in Federalist No. 46) but also from
judicial inability to identify a rule of law defining the limits of
"'commerce."
The terror of the slippery slope looms larger. Horsewhipping
for double parking; zoning laws eliminating churches; freedom to
use your business rival's trademark (if Johnson can burn the flag,
why can't Wendy's erect golden arches?). Surely judges must be
able to prevent such abuses; the need to do this counsels against
any rule of adjudication. Even Justice Scalia, our leading textualist, does not resist this siren's song. 92 He should; the parade of horribles is nothing but an argument against rules and serves (if indulged) to undermine rather than strengthen the claim for judicial
review.
Horribles have lurked in the background for a long time. Here
is one from Madison's Federalist 10, perhaps the greatest document of political theory penned on this side of the Atlantic.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within
their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general
conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it
must secure the national councils against any danger from
that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,
for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or
wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of
the Union than a particular member of it .... 93

" Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 Case W Res
L Rev 581, 590-93 (1989-90); Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2697 n 11.
13

Federalist 10 (Madison) in Wright, ed, The Federalistat 129, 136 (cited in note 47).
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Madison tells us that paper money is wicked-but not to worry,
the national government will be immune to its lure. It didn't work
out that way, although the transition was not exactly smooth. e4
Marbury does not contain an assertion along the lines of:
"Why, if there were no judicial review we might end up with paper
money; and as that is too horrible to contemplate . . . ." It is missing because it is no argument. At any instant some laws will be
unthinkable. The jurisprudence of horribles is based on that fact.
Yet the political climate changes; what is too horrible to contemplate in 1787 comes to pass during the Civil War. By the time the
bottom of the slippery slope is reached, society no longer views the
result as horrible. The exercise-whether it involves pointing a finger at paper money, or at the regulation of a farmer's baking wheat
into bread, or at some rule that outrages contemporary thought-is
no more than a truism. It gets its entire emotional punch by ignoring the possibility of cultural change. 95
Hypothetical horribles start from the belief that a legislature
has done what no reasonable person could want. Such a supposition is possible only if the political process has collapsed. If indeed
the process has collapsed, only judicial review can prevent disaster.
Once you introduce the possibility that the laws look horrible only
because the writer has assumed away the possibility of cultural
change, it is harder to justify the assumption that the law is a
product of political collapse and correspondingly hard to justify
tinkering with the level of abstraction now, for a real law, in order
to maintain discretion to deal with a horror that may never come
to pass (and, if it does, won't be viewed as horrible). It was the fear
of horribles, coupled with Chief Justice Marshall's slogan that "the
power to tax involves the power to destroy" ' 6 that led to an unjustifiably sweeping rule of tax immunities from which the Court is
beating a retreat.9 7 We should be able to learn from experience.
Arguments of this genus may have greater utility when the
Court is addressing the anachronistic law-one that could never be
passed today but that is kept in place by a dedicated interest
" Compare Hepburn v Griswold, 75 US (8 Wall) 603 (1870), with The Legal Tender
Cases, 79 US (12 Wall) 457 (1871) (overruling Hepburn), and Norman v Baltimore & Ohio
RR, 294 US 240 (1935) (the Gold Clause cases). See also David P. Currie, The Constitution
in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888 320-29 (Chicago, 1985).
95 See Paul Gewirtz, The Jurisprudenceof Hypotheticals, 32 J Legal Educ 120 (1982).
9 McCulloch, 17 US at 431.
See Washington v United States, 460 US 536 (1983), among many similar recent
cases. Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 540-43 (1985),
implies that the entire body of cases from McCulloch forward was misbegotten.
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group despite the injuries it inflicts on a larger (but more diffuse)
populace. I do not deny a modest role for what Henry Monaghan
has called constitutional common law: 98 the "remand" of obsolete
laws to the legislature, with the understanding that a contemporary legislative view prevails over the judges' assessment of the demands of modern society. The Court achieved something of the
sort when Furman v Georgia effectively required states to start
from scratch with capital punishment laws. 9 This echo of Justice
Holmes's rejoinder to Chief Justice Marshall ("Not while this
Court sits.") 10° is a far cry from a general power of superintendence
lest laws that seem outrageous to judges commend themselves to
the population.
IV.
My point in the end is simple. Meaning depends on the purpose to which we put it. The Constitution can mean one thing in a
classroom and another in a courtroom. Constitutional principles
may serve as moral or prudential arguments about how a community should conduct itself. Judges seek not enlightenment but right
answers, the core meaning within which further debate is ruled
out. That core will be smaller than the scope of all constitutional
interests and proprieties. In the end, the power to countermand
the decisions of other governmental actors and punish those who
disagree depends on a theory of meaning that supposes the possibility of right answers.
So you can't view abstraction in the abstract. You must search
for a level of generality simultaneously suited to the Constitution
and to the judicial role. One that will be neither broad nor narrow
all of the time, neither pro- nor con- state power. We must demand
not that it conform to the reader's political theory, but that it be
law.
"'Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv L Rev 1 (1975).
9 408 US 238 (1972).
100 PanhandleOil Co. v Mississippi, 277 US 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes dissenting) ("The
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.").
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